

Safety Regulation – A Risked Based Approach To Surveillance



Australian Government
Civil Aviation Safety Authority

www.casa.gov.au



safe skies for all

Surveillance function

- CASA's surveillance function as set out in section 9 (1)(f) of the Civil Aviation Act:

Conducting comprehensive aviation industry surveillance, including assessment of safety-related decisions taken by management at all levels for the impact on aviation safety.

safe skies for all

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

What is CASA aiming to achieve through surveillance ?

CASA's Surveillance Objectives

- Surveillance is the mechanism by which CASA monitors the ongoing safety health and maturity of authorisation holders.
- Surveillance comprises audits and operational checks involving the examination and testing of systems, sampling of products, and gathering evidence, data, information and intelligence.
- Surveillance assesses an authorisation holder's ability to manage its safety risks and willingness to comply with applicable legislative obligations.

safe skies for all

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

CASA's surveillance program


Key features:

- Uses a systems and risk based approach
- Requires recording and tracking of surveillance events in the approved IT system
- Involves analysis of results to evaluate authorisation holder's safety performance
- Surveillance program is regularly reviewed and updated

safe skies for all

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

Surveillance Framework



safe skies for all

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY


Systems and Risk-Based Approach to Surveillance

- **Aim:** encourage development of authorisation holders' systems and to encourage and guide the aviation industry to assume higher levels of responsibility
- **How:** CASA highlight to industry management
 - management's responsibility for safety under aviation safety legislation
 - deficiencies in existing safety systems
 - areas where more action is required to reduce potential for deficiencies

safe skies for all

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

Management System Model



safe skies for all

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

System Assessment

- Assessing the documented system, comparing against the actual system processes using the MSM
- The system is assessed for compliance and sampling conducted as appropriate.

Systems Risk Assessment

- Assesses the level of system risk mitigation exercised by the authorisation(Airline) against the generic CASA standard system risks
- A list of risks associated with the systems is found within the IT tool Sky sentinel

safe skies for all

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

The Assessment

- The assessment of the system and its risks is achieved by a questioning technique
- Using the four attributes (12 components) of the Management System Model the questions are applied against this system
- Some of the components are further broken down into sub-components to facilitate a more detailed evaluation.

Example Infrastructure -

- Facilities
- Tools, equipment and materials
- Data, information and records
- Personnel

CASA – Approved tools to support Surveillance /Assessment

- The CASA Surveillance Manual (CSM) sets out the policy and procedures to be followed in the surveillance of all authorisation types
- CSM provides CASA with a standardised, consistent and efficient surveillance process
- Supported by a single CASA approved IT tool (Sky Sentinel)

safe skies for all

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

Systems Audit In Practice

- Audit based on a defined scope developed to take into account the specific activities conducted by an authorisation holder ensuring their compliance with regulations and effective control of risks
- Often conducted by multidisciplinary team over multiple days
- Cabin safety Inspectors joins this team
- CASA defines this as a level 1 surveillance event

Level 1

- **Level 1 surveillance event** is a structured, forward-planned, larger surveillance event and covers:
 - Systems audits
 - Health Checks
 - Post-authorisation reviews

AOC Holders – How does CASA describe them?

- The CASA **description** of an AOC consists of five systems incorporating 20 elements and a number of system risks associated with each element.
- The example today is the system **operational personnel** – with an element that specifically deals with Crew Scheduling



The Element - Crew Scheduling

The Risk is that: A fatigued Cabin Crew member is rostered for or conducts a flight

The Questions

		Management System
Fatigued Management Process	Verify Cabin Crew understanding and application of the fatigue management process	Processes in Practice
Fatigue reporting process	Walk me through the fatigue reporting process and provide examples. Verify	Processes in Practice
Management of fatigue reports	How do you manage the information provided in fatigue reports	Monitoring and Improvement
Mechanisms to report fatigue	What reporting mechanisms do you have to report fatigue?	Monitoring and Improvement
Training	What training is provided to personnel regarding Cabin Crew fatigue	Management Responsibility
Company policy on fatigue	What is the company's policy on Cabin Crew fatigue	Management Responsibility
Processes to manage fatigue	What process do you have to manage cabin crew fatigue?	Management Responsibility
Scheduling	What fatigue preventative strategies or systems are employed during scheduling (if any)?	Management Responsibility
Systems	What systems are in place to support the process	Infrastructure
Documented processes of fatigue	Where is it documented?	Infrastructure

System Risk Indicator – Likelihood / Consequence

RISK CONTROL – LIKELIHOOD (cont)				
Process in Practice				
Fully Effective <i>Could only occur under specific conditions and extraordinary circumstances</i>	Mainly Effective <i>May occur in exceptional circumstances</i>	Partly Effective <i>Could occur but considered unlikely or doubtful</i> OR <i>Might occur some time in the future</i>	Ineffective <i>Will probably occur</i>	No Control <i>Is expected to occur in most circumstances</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Documented procedures cover all significant tasks and fully support the task o Processes meet regulatory requirements and are safe o No evidence that processes vary from documented procedure o Processes safe and appropriate o Safety equipment is used o Staff always attempt to comply with written procedures 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Significant documented procedures, however many inadequate or do not directly support process in practice o Process is sometimes ineffective or unsafe from not following procedures or given scant regard o Many process undertaken are adequate, however are prone to failing due to lack of personnel, poor infrastructure or lack of training o Evidence that processes are sometimes derived through word-of-mouth and spur-of-the-moment short cuts which vary from written procedures o Staff mostly comply with written procedures, however some staff are unaware of them o Shortcuts are sometimes taken owing to workload or time constraints associated with the task 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Little or no documented procedures and those that exist are inadequate or do not support process in practice, are ignored or are given scant regard o Procedures that are recorded mostly do not meet regulatory requirements and do not address risk mitigation aspects o Strong evidence that nearly all process derived through spur-of-the-moment decisions and communicated through word-of-mouth o Processes are either unsafe or flawed to the point of negating risk mitigation o Evidence that staff actively avoid using a procedure, if written, in favour of a self-developed process

System Risk Profile

- The SRP is a table of the most recent mitigated risk results for all assessed risks for an individual authorisation holder with full details of the risk assessments displayed in Sky Sentinel.
- The SRP provides a direct insight into an authorisation holder's ability to manage its systems risks.
- The SRP is also represented as a numeric/colour indicator, the System Risk Indicator (SRI).

The System Risk Indicator score should be interpreted as follows:

- **a red** (Extreme Risk) SRI score indicates that considerable and significant system risk issues exist within the authorisation holder's systems demanding close attention
- **an orange** (High Risk) SRI score indicates that a number of system risks within the authorisation holder's systems are being poorly managed and require attention in the medium Term
- **a yellow** (Medium Risk) SRI score indicates that, for the most part, the authorisation holder has control over its system risks
- **a green** (Low Risk) SRI score indicates that the authorisation holder has effective control over its system risks.

<http://www.casa.gov.au>

- Manuals
- Surveillance

safe skies for all

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

Thank You, Any Questions



safe skies for all

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY